Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security

Artikelnummer: 978-0-8047-5255-8
Einband: Fester Einband
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In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

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VerlagStanford University Press
EinbandFester Einband
Erscheinungsjahr2005
Seitenangabe264 S.
AusgabekennzeichenEnglisch
MasseH23.7 cm x B15.6 cm x D2.0 cm 925 g
AutorBasrur, Rajesh M

Über den Autor Rajesh M Basrur

Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.

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